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The Department of the Navy (DoN) has several efforts underway to transform U.S. naval
forces to prepare them for future military challenges.  DoN officials are generally satisfied
with the scope and pace of their transformation efforts, but some advocates of defense
transformation are not and recommend that current efforts be accelerated or expanded.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Introduction and Issue for Congress
This report focuses on the transformation of U.S. naval forces – the Navy and the
Marine Corps, which are both contained in the Department of the Navy (DoN).1  The
issue for Congress is whether the current DoN transformation efforts are sufficient, and
if not, what the options might be for accelerating or expanding these efforts.
Background
What is defense transformation?  Defense transformations can be defined as
infrequent, large-scale changes in military technology, concepts of operations, and
organization that lead to major changes in the ways in which wars are fought.  In contrast
to incremental or evolutionary military change brought about by normal modernization
efforts, defense transformations are more likely to feature discontinuous or disruptive
forms of change.  By most accounts, there have been a few or several such
transformations in recent decades or centuries.  More recent examples that are sometimes
cited include Germany’s creation in the 1930s of the concept of rapid blitzkrieg-style
warfare, and the U.S. Navy’s creation at the same time of long-distance, aircraft carrier-
centered naval warfare as a replacement for battleship-centered operations.  Some military
analysts believe that recent new technologies – including advanced information
technologies (IT) for networked operations, distributed sensors, unmanned vehicles, and
precision-guided munitions – have set the stage for a new defense transformation.  They
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also believe that U.S. military forces must transform themselves if they are to be
adequately prepared for 21st-Century military challenges, particularly so-called
asymmetric challenges, in which adversaries avoid competing head-on against current
U.S. military strengths.
Transformation advocates believe that a key asymmetric challenge in the next 10 to
25 years will be the development of so-called anti-access or area-denial capabilities –
capabilities intended to prevent U.S. military forces from gaining access to the ports,
airfields, bases, staging areas, and littoral (near-shore) sea areas that the United States
now depends on to mount military operations in distant military theaters.  Systems for
countering U.S. naval forces in littoral areas could include advanced diesel-electric
submarines, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, air-defense systems, and potentially weapons
of mass destruction.  Key transformation advocates include Andrew Marshall, the long-
time director of DoD’s Office of Net Assessment,2 Andrew Krepinevich, a protégé of
Marshall’s who is now the Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (CSBA),3 retired Navy Admiral William A. Owens,4 and retired Navy Vice
Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, former President of the Naval War College and head of
DoD’s new Office of Force Transformation.  Cebrowski was an early promoter of
network-centric warfare and created the Streetfighter project (see discussions below).
Bush Administration interest in defense transformation.  The Bush
Administration has identified transformation as a major goal of its defense policies and
programs.5
Navy and Marine Corps transformation efforts.  The Navy and Marine Corps
currently have several initiatives underway that are aimed at transforming U.S. naval
forces, including the following:
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory.  The Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory (MCWL) is arguably the first of DoN’s current major transformation
initiatives.  Since 1995, the MCWL, located at the Marine Corps base at Quantico, VA,
has directed a series of small- and large-scale experimental exercises intended to explore
new technologies and operational concepts for the Marine Corps.  Technologies explored
have ranged from less-than-lethal weapons to small, man-portable unmanned air vehicles
(UAVs).  Operational concepts examined have ranged from tactics for rapidly penetrating
enemy coastal areas with dispersed forces to new methods for carrying out military
operations in urban areas.
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Navy Warfare Development Command.  In 1998, the Navy established the
Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), located at the Naval War College at
Newport, RI, to generate ideas for naval transformation and to act as a clearinghouse and
evaluator of ideas generated in other parts of the Navy.
Fleet Battle Experiments.  The NWDC is overseeing a series of major exercises,
known as Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs), that are intended to explore new naval
operational concepts.6  The Navy and Marine Corps will also participate in
transformation-oriented joint (multiservice) exercises.
Network-centric warfare.  The central concept underpinning current DoN
transformation efforts is network-centric warfare (NCW), which entails using advanced
information technologies (IT) to link together personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations
into a series of local- and wide-area networks capable of rapidly transmitting critical
information.  Many in DoN believe that NCW will significantly increase U.S. naval
capabilities and operational efficiency.  Key NCW efforts include the Navy’s Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC) network for air-defense operations, the Naval Fires
Network (NFN) for gun and missile fire support operations, the IT-21 investment strategy,
which is creating a corporate intranet for Navy ships at sea, and the Navy/Marine Corps
Intranet (NMCI), which is creating a similar network to link together DoN installations.7
New crewing and deployment-cycle concepts.  The Navy is beginning to
experiment with new concepts for crewing and deploying Navy ships that could achieve
a significant reduction in Navy stationkeeping multipliers – the number of Navy ships of
a certain kind that are needed to keep one such ship on station in an overseas operating
area.  The Pacific fleet this year intends to conduct a “sea swap” experiment in which the
crews from 3 Spruance class destroyers are used to keep one Spruance-class destroyer on
station in an overseas operating area for an extended period of time, eliminating the weeks
of deployment time that would be consumed if each of the destroyers transited to and
from the operating area in succession, as under traditional Navy deployment procedures.
The Pacific fleet plans to follow this with a similar experiment involving 3 Arleigh Burke
class Aegis destroyers.  The Navy testified on this and other potential innovative crewing
and deployment-cycle concepts to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2002.
In marking up the FY2003 defense authorization bill (S. 2514), the committee included
a provision (Section 1023) directing DoD to submit a report to the congressional defense
committees by February 2003 on certain such concepts.8
Naval aviation.  The Navy is working to increase the number of aim points that an
aircraft carrier can attack within a 24-hour period from a couple of hundred to more than
one thousand by combining an increased aircraft sortie rate with compact air-launched
munitions.  The Navy  is also developing a next-generation aircraft carrier called the
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CVNX,9 unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and (with the Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency, or DARPA) a carrier-based unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV).
Surface ships.  Surface-ship transformation efforts center on the DD(X) family
of future surface combatants, which will use automation to permit much smaller crews
than previous Navy surface combatants, new hull designs, and advanced sensors and
weapons.10  The Navy and Marine Corps, along with the Army, are also conducting
experiments with two civilian high-speed catamaran ferries to assess the role that high-
speed transport ships using new hull forms might play in DoN’s future.  In addition, the
installation of theater-missile defense systems on Navy surface combatants will give the
Navy an ability to project a significant defensive capability inland.
Submarines.  Submarine transformation efforts include a program to convert four
Trident ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into cruise missile/special operations forces
submarines (SSGNs),11 programs for acquiring unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs)
to be deployed from submarines, studies and exercises for incorporating UAVs into
submarines, and a Navy/DARPA project that has generated ideas for significantly
expanding the number and variety of weapons and sensors carried by Navy submarines.
Marine Corps sea-basing concept.  The Marine Corps is now planning a
Maritime Prepositioning Force for the Future (MPF[F]) to replace the current Maritime
Prepositioning Ship (MPS) force of sealift ships that preposition equipment and supplies
for Marine expeditionary brigades near potential overseas operating areas.  As an
extension of the MPF(F) planning effort, the Marine Corps is developing a new
operational concept called sea-basing under which Marine forces in the future would
conduct future operations with less reliance on expeditionary airfields and built-up supply
areas ashore and more reliance on air-capable and sealift ships operating at sea.
Electric-drive propulsion.  The Navy plans for the DD(X) and other future
surface ships and submarines to employ advanced electric-drive propulsion technology
and integrated electric power systems.  Electric-drive could improve Navy ship
capabilities in several areas, including facilitating adoption of directed-energy weapons.12
Streetfighter project.  The Streetfighter project, centered at the Naval War
College was aimed at generating potential new naval capabilities and operational concepts
for fighting in littoral waters defended by anti-access/area-denial forces.  Streetfighter
CRS-5
13 For additional discussions of options for implementing naval transformation, see Work, Robert
O.  The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better?  Washington, 2002.  (Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) 155 p.; O’Rourke, Ronald.  Transformation and the
Navy’s Tough Choices Ahead: What Are the Options for Policymakers?  Naval War College
Review, Winter 2001.
forces were envisioned as constituting a specialized 10 or 20 percent adjunct to today’s
main naval forces and would comprise three main elements – networks of small,
distributed sensors, unmanned vehicles to deploy them, and new kinds of ships,
particularly small and fast ships that might more effectively evade enemy targeting.  The
Navy’s plan to build a smaller Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) as part of its DD(X) family
of future surface combatants appears to be an outgrowth of the Streetfighter project.
Issues for Congress
Are current DoN transformation efforts sufficient?  One potential issue for
Congress is whether current DoN transformation efforts are sufficient in scope and
urgency.  DoN officials and some Navy supporters appear generally satisfied with current
efforts.  They argue that U.S. naval forces as currently planned will be able to defeat
littoral anti-access/area-denial forces and thereby enable transformed Air Force and Army
forces to be deployed into the theater.  DoN officials support the need for transformation,
but argue that funding demands for transformation need to be balanced against funding
demands for readiness and for near-term procurement.
Advocates of defense transformation believe that current DoD transformation efforts
are inadequate and need to be substantially expanded and accelerated if U.S. forces are
to be adequately prepared to perform their missions 10 or 25 years from now.  They argue
that some efforts described by DoN officials as transformational are actually aimed at
more normal, incremental forms of change.
Key questions for Congress regarding naval transformation include the following:
What is the current and projected anti-access/area-denial threat to U.S. naval forces
operating in littoral waters, and will U.S. naval forces under current DoN plans be able
to counter this threat both now and over the next 10 or 25 years?  Do current DoN plans
take optimal advantage of opportunities provided by new technologies for U.S. naval
forces to perform their missions in the most cost-effective manner?
What are the options for expanding naval transformation?  Should
Congress choose to explore whether current DoN transformation efforts are adequate,
other questions would arise, including:  What are the options for expanding or
accelerating current naval transformation efforts?  The options below have been proposed
by transformation advocates as measures to accelerate DoN transformation generally or
to exploit specific technological opportunities for new weapons, particularly for
countering littoral anti-access/area-denial systems.13
Fleet Battle Exercises/experimental forces.  One option would be to expand
the Navy’s FBEs, incorporate them more fully into normal naval training operations, and
ensure that they are experimental undertakings rather than mere demonstrations of
existing capabilities, as some critics argue they are.  Other options would be to create a
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standing naval experimental force for testing new ideas without diverting regular Navy
forces from their primary missions.
Unmanned vehicles/netted sensors.  An additional option would be to expand
and accelerate the Navy’s current efforts for UAVs, UCAVs, UUVs, and netted sensors.
This could involve, among other things, developing more fully a recent Naval
Postgraduate School proposal for a small aircraft carrier, called Sea Archer, that would
carry about 16 UAVs and UCAVs.  As of 2001, the Navy planned on incorporating 6
UCAVs into each carrier air wing by 2017 – a plan that does not appear to keep pace with
Sec. 220 of the FY2001 defense authorization act (H.R. 4205/P.L. 106-398), which states,
“It shall be a goal of the Armed Forces to achieve the fielding of unmanned, remotely
controlled technology such that – (1) by 2010, one-third of the aircraft in the operational
deep strike force aircraft fleet are unmanned....”
New crewing and deployment-cycle concepts.  Another option would be to
accelerate the Navy’s efforts to institute innovative crewing and deployment-cycle
concepts.  A recent CBO report discussed how such concepts might be used on Navy
attack submarines.14
Alternative force architectures.  A related but more general option would be
to expand current DoN efforts to explore alternatives to the entire current U.S. naval fleet
architecture (i.e., the basic types and combinations of Navy ships and aircraft).  The
current fleet architecture the product of incremental, evolutionary development over the
last several decades.  Alternative architectures could involve new ship or aircraft designs
and new combinations of ships, aircraft, weapons, unmanned vehicles, and sensors.
Submarine weapons and sensors.  Another option would be to pursue with
more urgency and funding programs for submarine-deployed UUVs and UAVs and the
ideas generated by the Navy/DARPA submarine payloads program.  These ideas, if
implemented, could significantly transform the design and capabilities of U.S.
submarines.
Mobile offshore base.  Another approach would be to pursue the Mobile
Offshore Base (MOB), which would be a huge (up to about 5,000-foot-long) mobile,
floating platform composed of several large modules derived from designs for floating oil
platforms.  A MOB could be used to conduct air operations involving land-based aircraft
that require long runways, or as an at-sea base for supporting Army and Marine Corps
operations in distant theaters.  Congress and some of the services have shown some
interest in the MOB concept and have spent some funding on it in the past few years for
feasibility and preliminary design and engineering studies.
